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Abstract: Fjord crossings by car ferries constitute a vital part of the Norwegian trunk 
road system. The current subsidy scheme is considered to provide insufficient 
incentives for cost efficiency however. As a consequence, tender competitions have 
recently been introduced, so far on a few selected ferry links in order to gain 
experience with tendering on this area. Although subsidies have increased somewhat, 
there have been major improvements in the quality of services such as increased 
capacity, new ferries, increased frequencies and extended opening hours. A rough 
estimate of the additional production costs associated with these major improvements 
in the quality of services indicates that the tender competitions have produced 
significant cost savings. In addition, such improvements add benefits to the users, 
albeit not being estimated. Further, it has been a "winners curse" game providing a 
yardstick for the remaining ferry sector not being exposed to tender competition so 
far. In addition to an in-depth studies of the ferry links having been exposed to tender 
competition, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been applied in order to measure 
the relative improvements in efficiency for tendered and non-tendered ferry links. The 
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results from the DEA study resembles the findings of in-depth study, indicating that 
tendering has improved efficiency somewhat, although less than reported by the 
companies ex ante, indicating that the companies have been too optimistic when 
submitting their bids.  
1 Introduction 
Norway has a long coastline with a large number of fjords and islands. As a 
consequence, combined car and passenger ferries are vital in the Norwegian trunk 
road system. Although bridges and undersea tunnels have replaced a significant 
number of crossings during the last decades, the number of remaining crossings is still 
quite substantial.  
As the ferry links are considered to constitute a part of the Norwegian trunk road 
system, the National Public Roads Administration is responsible for supplying ferry 
services, regulating both prices and vital service parameters such as operating hours, 
frequencies etc.
2
 The actual production of the ferry services is performed by ferry 
companies, each operating a monopoly franchise on a bundle of ferry links. As 
revenue is insufficient to cover operating costs, the ferry companies are awarded quite 
substantial subsidies in order to make the ferry services economically viable. 
Until 1990, subsidies were awarded ex post on a cost-plus basis. The incentive for 
cost efficiency was thus weak. In order to encourage cost efficiency, subsidies were 
awarded ex ante on and after 1990. In order to induce further cost efficiency and thus 
allow for further cuts in the subsidies, the transport act was amended in 1991 so as to 
allow for tendering to a limited extent from 1994 onwards. The National Public Roads 
Administration made us of this opportunity and during the years that have followed, 
six ferry links have been exposed to tender competition of which the operations of the 
first four started during 1997. This paper describes and evaluates these tender 
competitions. In addition to an in-depth studies of the ferry links having been exposed 
to tender competition, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been applied in order to 
measure the relative improvements in efficiency for tendered and non-tendered ferry 
links.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, tender competitions are discussed in a 
theoretical perspective. Section 3 elaborates the tender competitions in the Norwegian 
ferry sector. A short introduction to Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) follows in 
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section 4. In section 5 we look into the production of ferry services with special 
emphasis on the choice of inputs and outputs for the DEA study. Section 6 gives a 
brief description of the data applied in the DEA study, while section 7 presents the 
results form the study. Section 8 concludes. 
2 Tender Competitions: Theory 
It has been recognised for a long time that monopoly provides weak incentives for 
efficiency. Although economists have tended to emphasise the deadweight loss 
associated with monopoly pricing, Hicks (1935, p.8) suggested that “the best of all 
monopoly profits is a quiet life”, presumably leading to internal or X-inefficiency 
(Leibenstein, 1966). At the same time, economies of scope or scale may call for a 
monopoly in order to avoid excessive costs. Thus, there seems to be a trade off 
between the exploitation of economies of scale and scope on the one hand and 
ensuring proper incentives for efficiency on the other hand.  
Several second best solutions have been suggested to induce efficiency while at the 
same time ensuring the exploitation of economies of scale and scope. The theory of 
optimal regulation (eg. Laffont & Tirole, 1993) suggests introducing incentive 
mechanisms in order to induce a monopoly to enhance efficiency. The theory of 
contestable market (Baumol et al, 1982) holds that provided that a monopoly is faced 
with the threat of competition and there are no sunk costs present, it will behave as if 
it is faced with actual competition in the market. An alternative and classical solution 
due to Demsetz (1968) is to refuse competition in the market, but rather allow for 
competition for the market through tender competitions. Both the theory of 
contestable market and Demsetz (1968) holds that by allowing for competition, one 
may exploit economies of scale and scope while at the same time provide proper 
incentives for efficiency. 
Competitive tendering is in effect an auction where a public agency awards a 
monopoly franchise to the company that offers to supply the product on best terms.
3
Demsetz (1968) suggested that the company that can meet the demand at the lowest 
                                                          
3 On auctions, see McAfee & McMillan (1987). 
possible price should be appointed the winner of the tender competition. According to 
Demsetz (1968), this should induce both internal and (second best) allocative 
efficiency. In practice however, tender competitions have usually been limited to 
induce internal efficiency only. In that case, the company that can produce a pre-
specified output at lowest possible cost is appointed the winner of the tender 
competition. It is this latter kind of limited tender competition that has been 
introduced recently in the Norwegian ferry sector. 
Tender competitions should improve internal efficiency for two reasons. First, each 
company will presumably strive for the most efficient or least costly way of producing 
the prespecified ferry service as this will both maximise each company’s probability 
of winning the tender competition and also maximise the company’s profits if being 
picked as the winner. Second, the incumbent companies may be replaced by more 
efficient companies. Thus, tender competition may induce proper incentives for 
cutting costs and also provide a favourable selection of the most cost efficient 
company or companies. Several studies have proved that tender competitions can 
bring about substantial cost savings.
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Prior to competitive tendering, the public agency must specify the various aspects of 
the service to be provided, the method by which the supplying company will be 
remunerated, the time period for which the supplying company will be awarded the 
exclusive right to supply the service, the yardstick to which the competitors will be 
evaluated and finally any penalties for not providing the specified service. Once a 
winner is appointed, this is specified in a contract entered by the agency and the 
appointed winner. 
Concerning the method by which the supplying company will be remunerated, there 
are two main methods. One option is to let the operating company retain the farebox 
revenue. If the farebox revenue is insufficient to cover the cost of production (which 
is the rule rather than exception in the Norwegian ferry sector), the public agency pays 
a subsidy in order to cover the deficit. Alternatively, the public agency retains the 
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farebox revenue and awards the operating company a subsidy in order to cover its 
costs of production. The former method is called the net-subsidy method, while the 
latter is called the full- or gross-cost method.  
As the operating company retains the farebox revenue when operating on net-subsidy 
terms, it is encouraged to promote demand by providing a satisfactory level of service 
quality. On the other hand, the operating company confers a high risk as it takes the 
rap for both cost overruns and declining revenue. If the company operates on gross-
cost terms however, it is only responsible for cost overruns and thus incurs less risk. 
However, as farebox revenue accrues to the public agency, the operating company has 
no incentive to promote demand when operating on gross-cost terms. 
Concerning the specification of the service to be provided, the public agency must 
specify for each ferry link the operating hours, service frequency, carrying capacity 
etc. Such requirements may be absolute or constitute minimal requirements. Also, if 
the company is to operate on net-subsidy terms, the public agency must specify the 
fare or fares. Further, the agency must specify whether capital equipment or assets (in 
our case; ferries) will be provided by the agency or not. If provided by the agency, we 
refer to this as an operating franchise. Otherwise, it is called an ordinary franchise. 
In case of an ordinary franchise, the capital assets owned by the incumbent company 
may constitute sunk costs, possibly deterring new entrants from making bids. As a 
consequence, competition will suffer. Also, an operating company being uncertain 
about the prospects for renewal of the contract or the market value of the capital in 
case of non-renewal, will be reluctant to undertake investments in capital. As a 
consequence, investments may be sub-optimal. This calls for choosing operating 
franchises. On the other hand, by not being the owners of the capital equipment, the 
companies incentives for maintenance of the equipment are poor. Further, as the 
operating companies do not incur the capital costs under operating franchises, but may 
reap any positive consequences (in terms of reduced operating costs), they have an 
incentive to persuade the public agency to invest excessively. 
Concerning the time period for which the supplying company will be awarded the 
exclusive right to supply the service, Posner (1972) have argued that as demand and 
cost conditions may change rather rapidly, one should opt for short periods. However, 
this neglects any administration costs associated with tender competitions. Also, it 
neglects the fact that as long as operating companies must undertake investments that 
are not easily transferable or at least to a substantial cost, their possibility to reap the 
gains from these investments are quite limited when contract periods are short. As a 
consequence, investments suffer. To prevent this, Williamson (1976) suggests that 
monopoly franchises should be awarded for rather long periods of time while Laffont 
& Tirole (1993) suggests that at the renewal stage, incumbent companies should to a 
certain extent be favoured to entrants. 
Concerning the selection of the winner, the general rule is to select the company that 
offers to supply the specified service at best terms. Concerning the choice of the terms 
or the yardstick to which the competitors should be evaluated, this depends on the aim 
of the tender competition. If the aim is to safeguard internal efficiency, the company 
offering to supply the specified service to least subsidy should be appointed the 
winner. If the aim is to promote allocative efficiency as well, Demsetz (1968) has 
suggested that the company that can meet the demand at the lowest possible price or 
fare should be appointed the winner of the tender competition.  
The selection of a winner is not without its problems however. For instance, suppose 
that the public agency has specified minimum requirements for the service, but allows 
for bids offering a higher quality of service. How should a choice be made between a 
bid involving low subsidies but also low quality and a bid involving larger subsidies 
but also higher quality? Alternatively, suppose that the fare level is used as yardstick.  
How should a choice be made between two bids where one of the bids outperforms 
the other for some market segments but falls short in other segments? 
Finally, as there is conflict of interest between the public agency and the operating 
company, a contract should specify penalties for not providing the contractual terms. 
For instance, a company operating on gross-cost terms has an incentive to reduce 
service quality in order to save on its cost of production. In order to prevent this, the 
contract may specify penalties for cancelled or late departures. 
3 Tender competitions in the Norwegian ferry sector 
Following an amendment of the transport act in 1991, tender competition was 
legalised to a limited extent for ferry services in Norway from 1994 onwards. The 
National Public Roads Administration made use of this opportunity and during the 
years that have followed, six ferry links have been exposed to tender competition. The 
deadlines for submitting bids on the first four links to be exposed to tender 
competition were fixed at the beginning of 1996, operations determined to start during 
1997. The remaining two links were exposed to tender competition during 1997, 
operations starting only recently. 
The responsibility for developing competitive tendering was left to the local road 
agencies. They had no prior experience in this field except for auctioning processes in 
the road building sector. Three of the six cases were organised on gross-cost terms 
while the remaining three where on net-subsidy terms. The experience was that gross-
cost term contracts had somewhat higher transaction costs and lack of incentives for 
the companies in order to enhance demand and thus revenue. In addition to these 
perspectives, the risk-premiums in the market for net-subsidy contracts were not 
higher than for gross-cost contracts. Since public sector is not able to diversify this 
kind of systematic risk, there is no reason to stick to gross-cost contracts. 
In order to attain a thorough understanding of the figures and the process, all the local 
road agencies and ferry companies have been subject to in-depth interviews. The in-
depth analysis has been explored in Hervik, Sunde, Bryn and Hauge (2000 ) and has 
been important both to public agencies and companies for the learning process to 
organise and take part in competitive tendering in the future. The interviews have 
revealed that each case is complex and unique. We will concentrate on the main 
findings and the general lessons to be learned from the six cases. 
The benefits for the public sector are not easy to estimate since simultaneously to 
exposing the links to tender competitions, the services have been subject to major 
improvements along many dimensions such as new ferries instead of old ones, 
increased capacity, increased frequencies and extended opening hours (eg. services 
during night hours). The total subsidies have increased somewhat, but only modestly 
by NOK 17 mill. This has occurred despite the fact that operating (or variable) costs 
have decreased (by NOK 19 mill). This is due to the fact that a total of eight new 
ferries were required. The value of these eight new ferries has been estimated to NOK 
740 mill. The value of the above mentioned qualitative improvements have been 
estimated to NOK 44 mill. Based on these figures, we have estimated that these 
improvements in quality would have added to a total subsidy requirement of NOK 80 
mill if the ferry links had not been exposed to tender competitions. Compared to the 
modestly increases in subsidies (NOK 17 mill), we conclude that tendering 
competition has led to substantial cost savings.   
In the political process to get accept from the local level to take part in competitive 
tendering, the service quality in these six links has been somewhat higher than what is 
customary in the Norwegian ferry sector. These incentives could be interpreted as a 
cost for introducing competitive tendering in the Norwegian ferry system. So far we 
have not performed a complete cost-benefit analysis, but rather a pure cost approach, 
estimating the costs associated with the improvements in service quality if the ferry 
links had not been exposed to tender competitions. In a cost- benefit approach one 
should include the willingness to pay for these quality improvements. 
From the in-depth studies we have also revealed that one seems to have ended up with 
a "winners curse" game for all the competitively tendered ferry links.  Uncertainties 
have been high due to uncertainties concerning manning requirements, wages and (in 
case of net subsidy terms) traffic-prognosis. The number of submitted bids varied 
between 6 and 9 in the 6 cases, the bids exhibiting large variations. In most cases, the 
winning bids involved significantly lower subsidies than would have the second-best 
bids. In some cases, subsidies would have doubled if the second-best bids had been 
accepted. In five of the six cases the incumbent companies won the tender 
competitions, probably in order to prove their capability to compete within this new 
competitive environment. The workforce was also highly motivated to win. So far 
opportunistic behaviour has not caused any problems. For instance, no company 
seems to have lowered the quality of service in order to cut costs. Further, in cases 
where improvements of the services have been required ex post, none of the 
companies seems to have exploited their strategic position in order to claim large 
additional subsidies in order to earn supranormal surpluses. The incentives to run 
these ferry links efficiently seems to have been very strong, and this gives an extra 
benefit to the public agencies to use this information in yardstick competition for the 
whole ferry system. 
The duration of the contracts have varied between 5 and 8 years depending on the 
need for asset specific investments. The problems with long term contracts are the 
lack of flexibility. The new ferries cannot bee relocated in order to optimise the total 
ferry system, but are stuck in the links according to the contracts. The contracts do not 
contain any incentives to improve efficiency through innovations during the contract 
periods lasting for up to 8 years. The companies have no incentives to increase their 
market and adopt to changes in the market especially in the gross-term contracts. New 
incentive contracts can be developed to increase flexibility. 
4 Measuring efficiency by means of DEA 
Tendering has been suggested as a means to enhance efficiency. Efficiency is not an 
unambiguous concept however. A major distinction is between allocative efficiency 
and internal efficiency. Roughly speaking, allocative efficiency refers to whether 
outputs are produced and consumed in optimal quantities while internal efficiency 
refers to whether the quantity of output is produced at least possible costs. In other 
words, the former refers to ‘doing the right things’ while the latter refers to ‘doing 
things right’. As tendering concerns the fulfilment of a given timetable to least cost,  
internal efficiency is the relevant concept when comparing tendered and non-tendered 
ferry links.
5
If a production unit is to be internally efficient, it must be impossible to increase any 
output and/or decrease any input without simultaneously reducing at least one other 
output and/or increasing at least one other input (Koopmans, 1951). In order to 
determine whether a production unit is efficient or not, we need to know the frontier 
of the production possibility set representing the efficient combinations of inputs and 
outputs. Such information is rarely available however. A solution is to construct a so-
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called best practice frontier based on the production units found to be the most 
efficient in practice. Farrell (1957) suggested that such a frontier could be constructed 
by enveloping the input-output data by means of a piecewise linear frontier. Such a 
frontier is depicted for a single input – single output case in figure 1 where z measures 
the quantity of the input, y measures the quantity of the output and A, B, C etc. are 
input-output combinations of production units that are to be evaluated. 
As can be seen, A, C, D and F are all located on the frontier. Such production units 
are termed best practice efficient. B and E are located off the frontier however, 
producing less output or by means of more input than is possible. Such production 
units are termed inefficient. In order to measure the degree of inefficiency, Farrell 
(1957), building on Debreu (1951), suggested that efficiency may be measured in 
terms of a simple index being equal to one minus the maximum proportional 
reduction in all inputs consistent with continued production of existing outputs. 
Alternatively, efficiency may be measured in terms of a simple index being equal to 
one plus the maximum proportional increase in all outputs consistent with continued 
use of existing inputs. The former is termed an input-saving measure of efficiency, 
while the latter is termed an output-increasing measure of efficiency. To illustrate, 
consider production unit B in figure 1. The input-saving and the output-increasing 
measure of efficiency suggested by Farrell (1957) is given by zB*/zB { E1 and yB*/yB
{ E2 respectively. As 0 < zB* d zB, it follows that 0 < E1 d 1. A production unit is best 
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practice efficient if E1 = 1, otherwise (that is; 0 < E1 < 1) it is inefficient. The lower 
the value of E1, the less efficient is the production unit considered. As yk* t yk, it 
follows that E2 t 1. A production unit is efficient if E2 = 1, otherwise (that is; E2 > 1) 
it is inefficient. The higher the value of E2, the less efficient is the production unit 
considered. 
Although pioneered by Farrell (1957), the piecewise linear frontier did not gain 
ground until Charnes et al (1978) ingeniously applied linear programming techniques 
in order to jointly calculate the efficiency measures and the relevant part of the 
frontier for each production unit in turn. This method has come to be known as Data 
Envelopment Analysis or DEA for short. Although their study was restricted to 
constant returns to scale, the methodology has been generalised by Bankers et al 
(1984) to handle variable returns to scale as is the case illustrated in figure 1. As the 
latter is more flexible than the former, we concentrate on the variable returns to scale 
model. A thorough introduction to the various DEA models can be found in Cooper, 
Seiford and Tone (2000). 
It should be admitted that there exist several alternative methods to DEA.
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 However, 
DEA is widely acclaimed for being a quite flexible tool for efficiency measurement, 
letting the data to a large extent reveal the possibly complex relationships between 
inputs and outputs. Further, the method handles multiple inputs and multiple outputs 
straightforwardly. As a consequence, recent years have seen a great variety of 
applications of DEA. Of particular interest is the previous DEA studies of Norwegian 
ferries and ferry links by Førsund & Hærnes (1994) and Minken et al (2000) 
respectively.
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5 The production of ferry services 
A ferry service consists of transporting motor vehicles and passengers according to 
fixed timetables. We may distinguish at least three activities associated with the 
production of a ferry service. First, there are the crossings per se. Second, each ferry 
must be loaded with cars and passengers prior to each crossing and correspondingly 
unloaded after each crossing. Third, the timetable may entail that a ferry lies idle 
between scheduled crossings. All these activities occupy a ferry of course. In addition, 
a ferry must be manned by a crew in the operating hours of the day (except for any 
possible breaks of sufficiently long duration). Finally, during a crossing and to some 
degree during loading and unloading, a ferry consumes fuel. 
These activities entail costs as ferries entail capital costs and costs associated with 
maintenance and repairs, fuel must be paid for and the crew must be paid wages. 
Capital costs depends on several factors, amongst others the construction cost of the 
ferry which in turn increases (less than proportionally) with the size of the ferry being 
measured in terms of its capacity in private car equivalent units (CEU). Fuel cost is 
the product of the price of fuel and fuel consumption, the latter depending on several 
factors such as size and type of ferry (eg. designed for long or short distance), 
operating conditions (eg. sheltered or unsheltered water), the load factor and of course 
the distance travelled. Crew cost is the product of crew wages and man hours, the 
latter depending on operating hours and the manning requirements for the ferry, the 
latter being positively correlated with the size of the ferry. 
Although this applies to all ferry links, the costs may vary considerable. This is due to 
the fact that ferry links vary in several respects. Amongst the major determinants of 
costs is the capacity of the ferry or ferries required in order to supply adequate 
capacity as capital, fuel and manning costs do all increase with the size of the ferry. In 
addition, fuel and manning costs depends on the use of the ferries. Fuel consumption 
and thus fuel costs depends mainly on distance travelled and the size of the ferries. 
Manning costs on the other hand, depends mainly on the operating hours and the size 
of the ferries. Thus, the size of the ferry or ferries, the distance travelled and the 
operating hours are all major determinants of the costs of a specific ferry link. In order 
to take this into account, we make use of two outputs being the product of the carrying 
capacity of the ferries (CEUs) and the distance travelled (O1) and operating hours 
(O2) respectively: 
O1: Carrying capacity times distance travelled (CEU-kilometers) 
O2: Carrying capacity times operating hours (CEU-hours) 
Although these two outputs are considered to be major determinants of costs, they are 
not entirely adequate. For instance, as the ferries consume fuel not only during 
crossings, but also during loading and unloading, we should take into account how 
large a share of the operating hours the ferries spends in berth as opposed to crossing. 
Also, as fuel consumption increases with the load factor, we should take into account 
the load factor as well. As such data are not readily available, we abstain from 
including these and possibly others measures of output. 
It should be noted that outputs O1 and O2 are both associated with the fulfilment of a 
timetable with a given capacity per unit of time rather than the number of vehichles 
and passengers transported. Thus, outputs are supply-related and not demand-related. 
Whether one should opt for supply-related or demand-related outputs is a highly 
controversial issue within the literature dealing with the measurement of relative 
efficiency in transit; see De Borger & Keerstens (2000). In our case where output is 
specified by the authorities and not left to the discretion of the companies and further, 
the cost associated with producing a ferry service is barely dependent on the use of 
that service, one should opt for supply-dependent outputs as is done in this study. 
As already noted, ferry services requires the input of ferries, fuel and crew. 
Concerning the former, accounting measures do not give an adequate picture of the 
capital costs involved; see Førsund and Hærnes (1994). As a consequence, several 
alternatives have been suggested. For instance, Førsund & Hærnes (1994) suggested 
that capital costs could be based on market value estimated from insurance premiums, 
although the authors admit that the procedure is not totally convincing. As an 
alternative measure of capital, Førsund & Hærnes (1994) suggested to use the ferries 
carrying capacity in terms of car equivalent units. However, this does not take into 
account that newbulding costs and hence capital costs increase less than 
proportionally with the capacity of the ferries as demonstrated by Minken et al (2000). 
Therefore, Minken et al (2000) suggests that capital costs should be based on 
estimated newbuilding costs. For ferries constructed recently, newbuilding costs are 
available. For older ferries, newbuilding costs are estimated by means of a regression 
analysis. We are in line with Minken et al (2000) and capital costs are thus calculated 
according to the procedure suggested therein. 
Further, repair and maintenance of a ferry is rather lumpy, varying significantly from 
year to year. Thus, the costs associated with repair and maintenance to be found in the 
accounts may partly refer to wear and tear in previous years. A solution suggested in 
Førsund & Hærnes (1994) is to calculate the average repair and maintenance costs 
based on the accounts from past years. In our case, this is not an option since several 
of the links tendered are making use of new ferries for which such information is not 
available. As a consequence, repair and maintenance costs are left out. 
As fuel may be assumed to be a homogenous input, we prefer to measure this input in 
physical units rather than monetary units. Fuel consumption in litres is found by 
dividing fuel costs by the fuel price per litre reported by the actual ferry company. 
Crew on the other hand, is measured in monetary terms being total (gross) wages. 
This is mainly due to lack of information concerning manning hours and overtime 
payments. Thus, we assume the following inputs: 
I1: Capital costs in NOK 
I2: Fuel consumption in litres 
I3: Total crew wages in NOK 
This is in line with Førsund & Hærnes (1994), while Minken et al (2000) measures 
fuel consumption in monetary units. 
6 The Data 
The Norwegian Pubic Roads Administration keeps track on the ferries, their yearly 
costs and the links in which they are operating. This information is based on yearly 
accounting reports obtained from the ferry companies. In addition, the Norwegian 
Pubic Roads Administration keeps track on the various aspects of the supply of ferry 
services such as operating hours, frequencies etc. Based on this information, we have 
constructed a data set for a sample of ferry links for the years 1996 and 1998. This 
data set contains data for all the input and output variables listed in the previous 
section. The years 1996 and 1998 were chosen as the former is the last year prior to 
tendering while the latter is the first year in which the tendered links were in 
operation. Ferry links for which the data was suspected to be unreliable were censored 
from the data set. This left us with a total of 63 ferry links of which 4 were tendered 
during 1997.
8
 The tendered ferry links were all either simple shuttle links between 
two ferry-berths or almost simple shuttle services. The same applies to 33 of the non-
tendered links. The remaining ferry links are more complex services between multiple 
ferry-berths. Summary statistics for the sample of ferry links are presented in table 
6.1. 
Table 6.1: Summary statistics. All figures in thousands. 
1996 
 Capital 
(NOK) 
Fuel 
(litres) 
Wages
(NOK)
CEU-km CEU-hours 
Min 703 88 1 648 158 24 
Average 4 210 1 164 7 222 5 059 389 
Max 16 787 6 500 26 136 44 668 1 981 
SD 3 864 1 123 4 491 9 678 380 
1998 
Min 703 94 1 840 165 26 
Mean 4 338 1 180 7 971 5 006 412 
Max 16 787 4 142 22 818 20 798 1 611 
SD 3 775 967 4 653 5 036 378 
The data kept by the Norwegian Pubic Roads Administration refers to the actual 
figures that have accrued. However, it was required that the competitors for the 
tendered ferry links should report expected costs or production plans in addition to 
their bids. This information allows one to compare the planned and actual figures for 
each tendered link. 
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7 Empirical results 
Input-saving measures of efficiency were obtained for each ferry link for the years 
1996 and 1998, assuming variable returns to scale and strong disposability. Summary 
results for the whole sample is presented in table 7.1. For the tendered ferry links, in 
addition to actual figures reported by the companies, results were also obtained for the 
figures according to the production plans that were reported by the ferry companies 
when submitting their bids. These are marked 1998* in the table. 
Table 7.1: Summary of efficiency scores: Sample of all types of ferry links.
Tendered Non-tendered 
1996 1998 1998* 1996 1998 
Min 55 % 60 % 58 % 48 % 43 % 
Average 71,3 % 75,3 % 79,3 % 83,0 % 79,6 % 
Max 91 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
SD 14,8 % 18,0 % 20,8 % 14,2 % 13,9 % 
No. of efficient units 0 1 1 8 7 
No. of units 4 4 4 59 59 
If we look at actual figures, we notice that in 1998, the first business year the tendered 
links were in operation, the average efficiency for the tendered links was about 75 
percent as compared to about 80 percent for the non-tendered ferry links. In other 
words, the tendered ferry links were about 5 percent less efficient than non-tendered 
links on average. Thus, on average, the tendered ferry links were outperformed by the 
non-tendered ferry links, quite contrary to expectations. The same applies to 1996 
however, the last business year prior to tendering. In fact, the difference was 
significantly more pronounced in 1996 as in that year the average efficiency for the 
tendered links was about 71 percent as compared to 83 percent for the non-tendered 
ferry links. In other words, the tendered ferry links were about 12 percent less 
efficient than non-tendered links on average prior to tendering. Thus, although the 
tendered links have performed worse than the non-tendered links on average, the 
differences were more pronounced in the year prior to tendering than in the first 
business year posterior to tendering. This can be measured in terms of the ‘catching 
up’ part of the Malmquist (1953) productivity index for each production unit (i.e. 
ferry link). For each production unit, this consists of computing the ratio of the 
efficiency score obtained for the most recent period (year) to the efficiency score 
obtained for the least recent period (year), in our case: 
1996
1998
E
E
MC  
where E1998 and E1996 are the efficiency scores obtained in 1998 and 1996 
respectively. If MC > 1, the production unit has become more efficient over time 
whereas if MC < 1, the production unit has become less efficient over time. If MC = 
1, the production unit has become neither more nor less efficient over time. Average 
figures for MC are reported in table 7.2. As can be seen from the table, on average, 
MC = 1,06 and MC = 0,96 for tendered and non-tendered ferry links respectively. In 
other words, tendered links have on average increased their relative efficiency 
whereas non-tendered links have on average decreased their relative efficiency. 
Table 7.2: Average efficiency: Sample of all types of ferry links. 
 Not Tendered Tendered: 
Actual figures 
Tendered: 
According to bids 
E1996 83,0 % 71,3 % 71,3 % 
E1998 79,6 % 75,3 % 79,3 % 
MC = E1998/E1996 0,96 1,06 1,11 
Ferry links were also ranked in descending order according to MC. Based on actual 
figures, the average rank for the tendered links turned out to be 26,5 whereas the 
average rank for non-tendered links turned out to be 32,4. Thus, tendered ferry links 
ranked somewhat better than non-tendered ferry links in terms of increase in 
efficiency over time. 
Table 7.2 also reports the findings for the tendered ferry links based on the figures 
according to the bids submitted by the winning companies. As can be seen, average 
efficiency for tendered ferry links in 1998 would have exceeded 79 percent, being 
only slightly less than the corresponding average efficiency for non-tendered links 
being slightly less than 80 percent. Further, on average, MC = 1,11 for the tendered 
ferry links as compared to MC = 0,96 for the non-tendered ferry links. In other words, 
if the ferry links had performed according to the plans reported by the companies, 
average efficiency would have increased significantly as compared to non-tendered 
ferry links. This is also confirmed by ranking the links according to MC in which case 
we obtain an average ranking of 14,5 for the tendered links as compared to an average 
rank of 33,2 for the non-tendered links. 
The sample above includes various types of ferry links, some being simple shuttle 
services between two ferry-berths while others are more complex services visiting 
multiple ferry-berth. As the tendered ferry links are all shuttle services or almost 
shuttle services, efficiency scores were also obtained for a sub-sample including 
shuttle services or almost shuttle services only. Summary results for this sub-sample is 
presented in table 7.3. As can be seen by comparing tables 7.2 and 7.3, average 
efficiency scores are somewhat higher for this sub-sample than for the whole sample 
as is expected. 
Table 7.3: Summary of efficiency scores: Sub-sample of shuttle links.
Tendered Non-tendered 
1996 1998 1998* 1996 1998 
Min 55 % 60 % 58 % 52 % 58 % 
Average 71,3 % 76,5 % 80,8 % 84,9 % 83,4 % 
Max 91 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
SD 14,8 % 18,4 % 22,4 % 13,6 % 13,7 % 
No. of efficient units 0 1 2 8 7 
No. of units 4 4 4 33 33 
Looking at the efficiency scores for 1996 and 1998 for this sub-sample, the same 
pattern appears as for the whole sample; cf. table 7.4. That is, on average, the non-
tendered ferry links outperforms the tendered ferry links but by more in 1996 than in 
1998. Further, while there is a slight decrease in average efficiency from 1996 to 1998 
for the non-tendered ferry links, there is an increase in average efficiency for the 
tendered ferry links. More specifically, looking at the actual figures, MC = 1,07 and 
MC = 0,98 for tendered and non-tendered ferry links respectively. In other words, 
tendered links have on average increased their relative efficiency whereas non-
tendered links have on average slightly decreased their relative efficiency. Looking at 
the figures reported in the plans from the winning companies, the difference would 
have been even more marked as on average, MC = 1,13 for the tendered links. 
Table 7.4: Average efficiency: Sub-sample of shuttle links. 
 Not Tendered Tendered: 
Actual figures 
Tendered: 
According to bids 
E1996 84,9 % 71,3 % 71,3 % 
E1998 83,4 % 76,5 % 80,8 % 
MC = E1998/E1996 0,98 1,07 1,13 
Ferry links were also ranked in descending order according to MC. Based on actual 
figures, the average rank for the tendered links was 16,5 whereas the average rank for 
non-tendered links was 19,3. Based on the figures reported in the plans from the 
winning companies, the average rank for the tendered links would have been 10,0 
whereas the average rank for non-tendered links would have been 20,1. Thus, in terms 
of increase in efficiency over time, tendered ferry links have ranked better than non-
tendered ferry links. 
Our main finding is thus that although on average the tendered ferry links have 
performed worse than their non-tendered counterparts, the former links have increased 
their average performance over time as opposed to the latter links showing a slight 
decrease in average efficiency over time. In order to test whether this difference in 
performance over time is significant, non-parametric Mann-Whitney (or Wilcoxon) 
rank tests were applied. Based on actual figures, tendered links were not found to 
perform significantly better than their non-tendered counterparts over time. Based on 
the figures obtained from the production plans reported by the winning companies 
however, tendered links would have performed significantly better than their non-
tendered counterparts if the plans had been fulfilled. The level of significance is 0,05 
(5 %) and 0,10 (10 %) for the whole sample and the sub-sample respectively. 
Our conclusion is thus that if the tendered links had performed according to the plans, 
tender competition would have had a statistical significant positive effect on internal 
or X-efficiency. The tendered links did not perform as well as planned however. 
Although the tendered links experienced an increase in efficiency whereas the 
remaining non-tendered links experienced a slight decrease in efficiency, the results 
were not statistically significant. It should be kept in mind however that the number of 
ferry links being exposed to tender competition is quite small. 
8 Concluding remarks 
Following an amendment of the transport act in 1994, six ferry links have been 
exposed to tender competition. Four of these were exposed to tender competition 
during 1996, operations starting during 1997. Operations of the remaining two links 
have started only recently.  
Although subsidies have increased somewhat, there have been major improvements in 
the quality of services such as increased capacity, new ferries, increased frequencies 
and extended opening hours. A rough estimate of the additional production costs 
associated with these major improvements in the quality of services indicates that the 
tender competitions have produced significant cost savings. In addition, such 
improvements add benefits to the users, albeit not being estimated. Further, it has 
been a "winners curse" game providing a yardstick for the remaining ferry sector not 
being exposed to tender competition so far. 
We have performed a DEA study of a sample of ferry links for which reliable data 
were obtainable. Based on efficiency scores for the year prior to tendering (1996) and 
the year posterior to tendering (1998), an index measuring relative improvements in 
efficiency over time was calculated for each individual ferry link. For the tendered 
ferry links being in operation in 1998, results were obtained both for the actual figures 
and for the figures obtained from the production plans reported by the companies ex 
post. It turned out that if the tendered links had performed according to the plans, 
tender competition would have had a statistical significant positive effect on internal 
or X-efficiency. The tendered links did not perform as well as planned however. 
Although the tendered links experienced an increase in efficiency whereas the 
remaining non-tendered links experienced a slight decrease in efficiency, the results 
were not statistically significant. Thus, the companies seems to have been too 
optimistic when submitting their bids. It should be kept in mind however that the 
number of ferry links being exposed to tender competition is quite small. 
Looking ahead, a major threat for the success of future tender competitions is the 
possible lack of competition. While competition seems to have been present in the 
previous tender competitions, several of the major ferry companies are now 
considering merging. Such mergers into larger companies may impede competition 
through collusion. The Norwegian ferry sector may be expected to be particularly 
vulnerable to such mergers as the operations of these kinds of ferry services may be 
considered to be distinctively Norwegian so that the threat of competition from 
companies from abroad may be expected to be weak or even absent. In other words, 
the Norwegian ferry sector may not be contestable. 
Concerning future tender competitions, a major challenge concerns the exploitation of 
possible economies of scale and scope in the ferry sector.
9
 If present, such economies 
calls for tendering bundles of ferry links rather than individual links. This necessitates 
the composition of optimal bundles. However, the ferry companies are presumably 
better informed than the authorities in this respect. Rather than defining (possibly non-
optimal) bundles prior to the tender competition, Brewer & Plott (1996) and Milgrom 
(1997) suggests that the bidders should be allowed to make bids on bundles composed 
by themselves. As the composition of bundles is not co-ordinated, the bundles are not 
necessarily compatible with each other. Brewer & Plott (1996) and Milgrom (1997) 
suggest multi-stage auctions in order to cope with this problem. Despite being a 
fascinating solution to the problem of optimal bundling, the theory has revealed that 
free-rider problems may arise that may preclude optimal bundling. 
While tender competition has been introduced in order to enhance internal or X-
efficiency (‘doing things right’), there has been a growing concern for allocative 
efficiency (‘doing the right things’). For instance, Larsen (1999) considers the design 
of proper regulations in order to induce public transit companies to provide optimal 
public transit services.
10
 In a pioneering study however, Demsetz (1968) raised the 
provocative question ‘Why regulate utilities?’ and suggested that regulations should 
be replaced by tender competitions in order to enhance (second best) allocative 
efficiency (in addition to internal or X-efficiency). More specifically, Demsetz 
suggested that the company offering to meet the demand at the lowest possible price 
should be awarded the monopoly franchise. Despite being a fascinating solution, it is 
not straightforwardly applicable. For instance, picking a winner is not straightforward 
                                                          
9 A possible source of economies is the need for spare ferries. As breakdowns in several ferries at the 
same time is rather unlikely, it is optimal for a bundle of ferry links to share a spare ferry. 
unless efficiency calls for a uniform price. More specifically, in scheduled transport 
services the quality of the services (such as operating hours, frequency etc.) might be 
just as or even more important for allocative efficiency than are prices. Thus, one 
should consider tender competitions in which companies are given the discretion to 
specify the public transit services that are to be provided. In this respect, a major 
challenge is to design proper yardsticks that enhance allocative efficiency.  
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